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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 Biometric recognition has achieved a considerable popularity in recent years 
due its various properties and widespread application in various sectors.  These 
include very top priority sectors like countries boundary security, military, space 
missions, banks etc. Due to these reasons the stealing of biometric information is a 
critical issue.  To protect this user biometric template information there should be 
efficient biometric template transformation technique and thereby the privacy of user 
is preserved.  Non-invertible transformation can keep the user template based 
transformed information maximum secure against the regeneration.  But the 
performance of non-invertible template protection mechanism will be reduced by the 
increase in security. This limitation of non-invertible biometric transformation 
should be solved.  This research aims to develop a hybrid biometric template 
protection algorithm to keep up a balance between security and performance in 
fingerprint biometric system.  The hybrid biometric template protection algorithm is 
developed from the combination of non-invertible biometric transformation and 
biometric key generation techniques.  To meet the research objective this proposed 
framework composed of three phases: First phase focus on the extraction of 
fingerprint minutiae and formation of vector table, while second phase focus on 
develop a hybrid biometric template protection algorithm and finally the third phase 
focus on evaluation of performance of the proposed algorithm.  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 Kebelakangan ini, biometric recognition telah mencapai populariti yang 
tinggi disebabkan kepelbagaian ciri dan aplikasi meluas dalam pelbagai sektor.  Ini 
termasuk sektor keutamaan paling atas seperti negara-negara sempadan keselamatan, 
ketenteraan, misi angkasa, bank dan lain-lain.  Oleh kerana sebab-sebab ini mencuri 
maklumat biometrik adalah isu yang kritikal.  Untuk melindungi maklumat pengguna 
template biometrik ini perlu ada teknik transformasi biometrik template yang cekap 
dan dengan itu privasi pengguna akan terpelihara.  Transformasi non-invertible boleh 
menyimpan template pengguna berasaskan perubahan maklumat yang maksimum 
yang selamat daripada dijana semula.  Tetapi tahap ketepatan pengesahan dicapai 
oleh teknik transformasi non-invertible akan berkurang dengan peningkatan 
keselamatan.  Batasan transformasi biometrik non-invertible perlu diselesaikan.  
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk membangunkan algoritma perlindungan template hibrid 
biometrik untuk mengikuti keseimbangan antara keselamatan dan prestasi dalam 
sistem cap jari.  Biometrik.  algoritma perlindungan template hibrid biometrik 
dibangunkan daripada gabungan transformasi biometrik non-invertible dan 
penjanaan kunci biometrik.  Untuk mencapai objektif kajian, rangka kerja yang 
dicadangkan ini terdiri daripada tiga fasa: fasa pertama fokus kepada pengekstrakan 
perincian maklumat cap jari dan pembentukan jadual vektor, manakala fasa kedua 
fokus kepada membangunkan algoritma perlindungan template hibrid biometric dan 
akhir sekali fasa ketiga fokus kepada pengesahan dan penilaian prestasi algoritma 
yang dicadangkan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
 The future of identity depends fully on biometrics, and then the stealing of 
biometric information and thereby compromising the biometric system will be 
challenging issues.  Biometric system process two main functions, they are 
Enrollment and Authentication.  Enrollment is the process of capture the user 
biometric information and extraction of the features from it and this extracted feature 
called as template is stored in the database.  Meanwhile Authentication is the process 
of user biometric information captured and extracted features or templates are 
compared with the ones already exists in the database.  Due to the increase in 
biometric systems there is a huge dependency on biometric data; however this 
biometric data could have serious lifelong implications.  The main reason for this is 
the biometric characteristics are unique for each individual and also with are not 
changeable though out the person lifetime.  Whenever a biometric data is 
compromised form the database it can give an opportunity for attackers to misuse it 
various kind or even they can make artificial finger from that biometric raw data.  
Therefore the protection of biometric database is very important factor.   
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1.2 Background of the Problem 
 
 
 Millions of victims are infected by identity theft; it is possible to regenerate a 
new credit card or social security number.  If bank social media accounts get hacked, 
it is possible to reset also.  But when the biometric information is stolen, is there any 
solution to regenerate or reset? No they cannot because they are permanent 
identification markers.  Once the biometric information is snagged by an attacker, 
they can control it forever (Goodman and Marc, 2015).  Many of the attackers and 
thieves are already working diligently to circumventing these biometric systems.  
“To reveal this issues (Matsumoto et al., 2002) conducted a study on recreating a 
mold using gelatin for the fingerprint image impression taken from the wineglass and 
they concluded that; there can be various dishonest acts using artificial fingers 
against the fingerprint systems.  Manufacturers, vendors, and users of biometric 
system should carefully examine security of their system against artificial clones.  
How to treat such information should be an important issue.” 
 
 
 Due to the growth in biometric technologies there is demanding need for 
security mechanism in this area.  Maltoni et al. (2009) analyzed various biometric 
technique and they concluded that fingerprint technology keep up the maximum 
balance between all the biometric properties.  So, they have wide acceptance among 
the various biometric techniques like hand, iris, face, voice etc.  Also due to the large 
application of fingerprint biometrics various sectors like banks, hospitals etc. there is 
increase in attacks against this stored fingerprint templates in the biometric database.  
So any compromise to the biometric information of the individuals stored in the 
database can cause critical damage to the individual forever.  So there is a demanding 
need for biometric template security stored in the biometric database. 
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Figure 1.1: Problem characteristics of biometric template security 
 
 
 Identity of the individual is one of the important parameter in organization 
and government security systems, where any errors causing will be threaten the 
integrity of the overall security system.  For example highly confidential and security 
areas like international border control, nuclear plant, airport, issuance of national 
passport and identity documents etc. where the integrity of the security system 
should be maximum.  Current trend in the biometric security systems replaced most 
of the traditional ways of identity recognition and authentication.  Biometric is 
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science of authenticating a user based on the physiological or behavioral features of 
an individual.  These features include fingerprints, facial features, iris, voice, palm 
etc. 
 
 
 Biometric Recognition system basically have four modules: they are sensor 
module, feature extraction module, matching module and finally the decision 
module.  Ratha et al. (2001) have pointed out several level of attacks that may be 
used against a biometric recognition system they are: 1) a artificial finger maybe 
introduced at the sensor, 2) there can be resubmission of illegally intercepted 
information to the biometric recognition system, 3) there can be replacement of 
feature information by a Trojan horse algorithms that creates pre-determined feature 
sets, 4) there can be replacement of original feature sets with synthetic feature sets, 
5) there can be replacement of the matcher by Trojan horse algorithms that produces 
high scores thus ignoring system security, 6) there can be intentional modification to 
the template or deletion  of information or addition of illegal template in the stored 
database, 7) there can be modification to the information in the communication 
channel between various modules of the biometric system (Jain et al., 2005) and 8) 
the final outcome from the biometric system can be overruled. 
 
 
 There are various techniques proposed in the literature for the security of the 
biometric templates.  Soutar (Bioscrypt) proposed use of coarsely quantized match 
score by the matcher to avoid the Hill- Climbing attack from successfully merging.  
Pankanti and Yeung (1999) come up with an invisible fragile watermarking 
technique to identify the tampering in the fingerprint image.  Jain and Uludag (2003) 
proposed use of steganography to hide biometric fingerprint details in the face image 
and there by protect the biometric data when transmitted over non-secure 
communication channel.  The main idea behind the use of watermarking and 
steganography is to prevent the sensitive template data from unauthorized 
modification and eavesdropping attacks.  But there is an increased complexity and 
lack in overall security and privacy to the user biometric information which is stored 
in the database.   
 
5 
 
 Biometric Cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics highlight so many 
advantages over the traditional generic biometric system.  This technique helps to 
obscure the biometric template information, such that it is very difficult to obtain the 
original biometric template.  In these techniques Pseudonymous Authentication is 
carried out (Authentication in the encrypted domain).  Biometric Cryptosystems and 
cancelable biometrics have the property of Revocability of templates (many 
occurrence of secured biometric template can be generated).  These two techniques 
increase the security against various traditional attacks, there by more social 
acceptance can achieved to the biometric applications.   
 
 
 Biometric Cryptosystems needs the storage of biometric dependent public 
data, which is used to retain or generate keys; these are called as helper data (Jain et 
al., 2008).  In Biometric Cryptosystems key release mechanism is done with the help 
of biometric template information also known as biometric dependent key-release.  
Boyen and Xavier (2004) described a vulnerability of secure sketches and fuzzy 
extractors while an attacker having multiple invocations of the given set of secrets 
that are used to reconstruct the original biometric template.  Stoianov et al. (2009) 
point out a nearest imposter attacks in which specific parts of a large biometric 
template information is mixed to retain high matching scores.  They also point out 
that successful encoding of chunks of biometric information is indeed need to bind 
sufficiently long keys may suffer from low entropy and are easily decoded.  Keys 
used in fuzzy commitment schemes have suffer from low entropy, which reduces the 
difficulty for brute force attacks (Juels and Wattenberg, 1999). 
 
 
 Ignatenko and Willems (2010) conducted study to determine privacy and 
security weakness of fuzzy commitment scheme and results point out that fuzzy 
commitment schemes leak data in bound keys and non-uniform templates.  Hong et 
al. (2008) pointed out vulnerabilities that can be caused when doing hardened fuzzy 
vaults.  The fuzzy vault scheme does not hide the original biometric information but 
obscure it by helper data.  More over in the key retrieval rates are given by the 
application, the attacker can still unlock vaults if the helper data does not obscure the 
original biometric template properly.  Davida et al. (1998); Claus and Ralf (2004) 
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stated helper data based key generation schemes can be attacked via record 
multiplicity.  If an imposter have access to several different types of helper data and 
its related secret keys of the same user, an association of these can help the attacker 
to reconstruct an possible biometric templates obtained at enrollment.  Also key 
generation schemes likely to extract short keys which increase probability to be 
guessed in brute force attacks with in a sensible feature space.  Key generation 
schemes likely to have less accuracy compared to key binding schemes, hence 
expected to be vulnerable to false acceptance attacks (Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011).   
 
 
 Cancelable biometrics is applied in order to make it very hard to recover the 
original biometric information.  The individual characteristics of the biometric 
template should not be reduced (constraint on False Accept Rate), same time there 
should not be any tolerance to intra class variations (Constraint on False Rejection 
Rate) (Ratha et al., 2001).  Quan et al. (2008); Shin et al. (2009) point out attack 
against block re mapping and surface- folding techniques.  Kong et al. (2006) states 
that most approaches to biometric salting becomes heavily vulnerable to attack if the 
biometric token is stolen.  More over if the salting technique used is invertible; the 
template information can be regenerated and used in masquerade attacks.  Lumini 
and Nanni (2007) point out that BioHashing techniques may exhibit low performance 
in case attackers are in control of secret tokens. 
 
 
 When considering the performance analysis of biometric systems commonly 
used factors are False Rejection Rate (FRR), False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and 
finally Equal Error Rate (EER).  The FRR of Biometric cryptosystem is the rate of 
correct user rejected by the biometric system.  The FAR of Biometric cryptosystem 
is the rate of wrong user accepts by the biometric system.  In cancelable biometric 
transformation and alignment of transformed biometric information needed to be 
optimized in order to keep up the performance of the biometric recognition system.  
To achieve maximum privacy to user data the biometric template protection 
mechanism should be designed such a way that is very hard for the attacker to 
regenerate the original biometric information from the transformed template 
information.  This can be achieved by non- invertible biometric transformation; here 
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the compromise of secret key will not help in generating the original biometric 
information of the user.  Although non-invertible biometric transformation have this 
advantages, but there is imbalance between the non-invertibility and discriminability 
properties.  These two properties should be keep up by a good non-invertible 
biometric transformation.  The non-invertibility factor increases the security to the 
user biometric information.  So many works proposed to keep up the security to user 
template information, but still the reduction in the discriminability factor or accuracy 
is an important research domain.  Basically accuracy degradation is caused by 
increase in FAR and FRR rates, these rates should be limited to maximum to get 
better accuracy in authentication.   
 
 
 
1.3 Statement of Problem 
 
 
 The user biometric information should be protected by good biometric 
transformation mechanism.  The application of non-invertible biometric 
transformation can provide better security to biometric information, but the non-
invertible transformation reduces the performance of the biometric identification 
system this is because of the increase in EER value.  The main cause by which the 
EER value is increased is due to the usage of highly complex algorithms for 
transformation.  On the other hand if too low complex algorithm usage can reduce 
security of the biometric information.  Therefore there is a demanding need for non-
invertible biometric template protection algorithm that can keep up both security and 
performance in balanced condition. 
 
 
 
1.4 Aim 
 
 
 To develop a hybrid biometric template protection algorithm to balance 
security and performance in fingerprint biometric system.   
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1.5 Objectives 
 
 
 The objective of this research is to refine the security and balance it with the 
performance of non-invertible biometric protection technique in fingerprint biometric 
system by the application of hybrid biometric template protection algorithm.  The 
objective are as stated below: 
 
i. To extraction the fingerprint minutiae and formation of vector table. 
ii. To develop a hybrid biometric template protection algorithm. 
iii. To evaluation of performance of the proposed algorithm. 
 
 
 
1.6 Scopes 
 
 
 For this research the following constraints are considered: 
 
i. Fingerprint images taken from FVC2002 Database 
(http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002/). 
ii. Algorithms generated by MATLAB coding. 
iii. 256x 364 size TIFF images are used as Fingerprint image. 
iv. False Accept Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and Equal Error Rate 
(EER) are used to determine performance of algorithm. 
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1.7 Importance of the Research 
 
 
 This research importance is highlighted as follows. 
 
i. The fingerprint uniqueness makes a demanding interest to adopt a strong 
security to the fingerprint image stored in the fingerprint biometric system 
database.  As we know today most of the security authentication uses 
biometrics and fingerprint the most widely used biometric technique.  So 
once a fingerprint is stolen from a database it can create a heavy damage to 
that fingerprint owner in current world.  So there should be some good 
security mechanism for keep the fingerprint image not available to the 
attacker.  This can be solved by template transformation technique or 
cancelable biometrics. 
 
ii. Biometric information are permanently linked with users, such that it can be 
misused to perform an illegitimate tracking of the activities of the users 
enrolled to different databases. 
 
iii. Disclosure of biometric template information of the users can be misused by 
the illegitimate users to produce artificial samples or gummy fingers for 
spoofing attack. 
 
iv. This research work presumes to strengthen the security for the fingerprint 
biometric authentication system and keep up the accuracy to a satisfactory 
level. 
 
 
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
 
 
 The research methodology consists of three phases they are shown in Figure 
1.2.  Detailed methodology for the work is explained in Chapter 3. 
10 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Research methodology 
 
 
 
1.9 Organization of the Research 
 
 
 This research is made up of five chapters.  Chapter 1 gives introduction to this 
research.  Chapter 2 provides literature review about different biometric template 
security mechanisms used for protecting of user privacy.  Chapter 3 provides the 
research methodology of this study.  In Chapter 4 the extraction of fingerprint is done 
and finally a vector is created.  In Chapter 5 the hybrid biometric template protection 
algorithm is designed and evaluation is done to achieve the final results.  Finally 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion for this research work. 
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